Wednesday, June 24, 2009

Legal Professional Privilege

In response to numerous complaints on SFC's authorization of Lehman Brother Minibonds, SFC has alleged that the regulatory focus for authorizing product documentation is on disclosure rather than on the commercial merits of the investment. However, SFC would examine whether any facts, matters or circumstances that should have been disclosed to SFC were not disclosed by the Minibonds issuers and their advisers at the time the offer prospectuses and marketing materials were submitted for vetting.

Recently SFC has applied to the High Court for an order directing Lehman Brothers Asia Ltd (in liquidation) to comply with an SFC Notice to produce certain records in connection with its investigation of the offer and marketing of Minibonds. The Notice required Lehman Brothers to produce to SFC all documents relating to the assessment of Minibonds by an internal Lehman Brothers committee called the New Product Review Committee.

SFC believes the Committee oversaw or approved products including the Minibonds and that these documents are relevant to its investigation. In response to the Notice, lawyers for Lehman Brothers produced certain documents but objected to the production of 17 other documents on the grounds that these documents should not be produced because they were the subject of a claim of legal professional privilege. It appears the claim arises because a member of the Committee was an in-house lawyer at Lehman Brothers.

SFC disputes that the entire contents of these documents are necessarily the subject of a valid claim of legal professional privilege and asserts that they should be produced to SFC in compliance with the Notice. Discussions between SFC and the liquidators of Lehman Brothers and their lawyers, since December 2008, have not resolved this claim of privilege. In bringing this proceeding before the court, SFC wants to ensure there is an independent adjudication on the issue.

Legal professional privilege is an interesting subject of debate in this case. It protects communications between a lawyer in his professional capacity and his client, provided they are confidential and are for the purposes of seeking or giving legal advice. However, in general documents sent to or from an independent third party (even if created with the dominant purpose of obtaining legal advice) should not be covered by this privilege. I am interested to know what exactly the documents SFC is looking for.

Wednesday, June 17, 2009

Rampant Churning

US SEC and Alabama Securities Commission (ASC) recently charged a broker-dealer in connection with rampant churning of customer accounts, widespread supervisory failures, and other securities violations that resulted in significant harm to clients and substantial profit to the firm. Also charged by SEC and ASC were several of the firm's senior officers and registered representatives. Churning is a fraudulent practice that occurs when a broker engages in excessive trading without regard to the customer's investment objectives for the purpose of generating commissions and other revenue.

SEC alleges that Aura Financial Services and six registered representatives used fraudulent sales practices and high-pressure sales tactics to convince customers to open and invest money in Aura brokerage accounts, which the brokers subsequently churned. Aura and the brokers enriched themselves with approximately US$1 million in commissions and other fees paid by the customers while largely depleting the customers' account balances through trading losses and excessive transaction costs.

ASC issued an amended order to show cause against Aura and three of its senior officers, based upon the findings of several ASC audits. The order alleges that Aura and the three managers violated their supervisory and compliance responsibilities under the Alabama securities laws. Despite the fact that many of the firm's representatives had criminal or disciplinary backgrounds and multiple prior customer complaints, Aura and the three managers failed to adopt appropriate procedures, failed to enforce rules, failed to conduct branch office inspections, and failed to maintain files of and follow up on customer complaints.

In addition to alleging the supervisory failures, ASC also cited Aura with unauthorized trading by a former representative which included trading after the death of the trustee. The firm's representatives operated under the "honor system" and documentation evidencing active oversight was lacking. Aura failed to perform independent review of customer complaints and summarily dismissed certain complaints based solely on the representations of their agent or representative.

The amended order requires Aura, within 28 days, to show cause to ASC why its registration as a broker-dealer and agent in the State of Alabama should not be suspended or revoked. The named supervisors in ASC's order are Timothy M. Gautney, Aura's founder and Chief Operation Officer; Loyd Gilford King, Aura's Corporate Treasurer; and John Wesley Woodruff, Jr., Aura's Chief Compliance Officer.

SEC's complaint has charged six current and former Aura registered representatives located in branch offices in Florida and New York. SEC alleges that the scheme began in approximately 2005. Although some of the misconduct stopped when two of the registered representatives left Aura in August 2008, the scheme continued through at least April 2009.

What a house of thieves!

Wednesday, June 10, 2009

Unregulated Financial Markets and Products

In May 2009, IOSCO's Technical Committee published "Unregulated Financial Markets and Products - Consultation Report". The Report contains interim recommendations for regulatory action designed to improve confidence in the securitisation process and the market for credit default swaps (CDS). The interim recommendations contained in the Report address issues of immediate concern with respect to securitised products and CDS. Securitised products include asset-backed securities (ABS), asset-backed commercial paper (ABCP) and structured credit products such as collateralised debt obligations (CDOs), synthetic CDOs, and collateralised loan obligations (CLOs).

While encouraging industry responses in the securitisation process and CDS market, IOSCO recognises that industry initiatives alone will not be sufficient to restore transparency, market quality and integrity and has therefore formulated a number of interim recommendations to address the following concerns associated with both these areas.

Securitisation

Interim Recommendation 1 – Wrong Incentives
  1. Consider requiring originators and/or sponsors to retain a long-term economic exposure to the securitisation;
  2. Enhance transparency through disclosure by issuers of all checks, assessments and duties that have been performed or risk practices that have been undertaken by the underwriter, sponsor and/or originator;
  3. Require independence of experts used by issuers; and
  4. Require experts to revisit and maintain reports over the life of the product.

Interim Recommendation 2 – Inadequate risk management practices

  1. Mandate improvements in disclosure by issuers including initial and ongoing information about underlying asset pool performance and the review practices of underwriters, sponsors and/or originators including all checks, assessments and duties that have been performed or risk practices that have been undertaken. Disclosure should also include details of the creditworthiness of the person(s) with direct or indirect liability to the issuer;
  2. Strengthen investor suitability requirements as well as the definition of sophisticated investor in this market; and
  3. Encourage the development of alternative means to evaluate risk with the support of the "buy-side".

Interim Recommendation 3 – Regulatory structure and oversight issues

IOSCO recommends that jurisdictions should assess the scope of their regulatory reach and consider which enhancements to regulatory powers are needed to support the interim recommendation #1 and #2 in a manner promoting international coordination of regulation.

Credit Default Swaps

Interim Recommendation 4 – Counterparty Risk and Lack of Transparency

In forming the interim recommendations below, IOSCO considered the establishment of central counterparties (CCPs) for the clearing of standardised CDS as an important factor in addressing the issues of counterparty risk and transparency.

Interim Recommendation 5 – Regulatory structure and oversight issues

IOSCO recommends that jurisdictions should assess the scope of their regulatory reach and consider which enhancements to regulatory powers are needed to support the interim recommendation #4 in a manner promoting international coordination of regulation.

Wednesday, June 03, 2009

Program Trading & Pre-Hedging

FSA recently banned and fined trader Nilesh Shroff for deliberately disadvantaging his customers by "pre-hedging" trades without their consent. Shroff has been prohibited from performing any regulated function on the grounds that he is not fit and proper and has been fined £140,000.

While Shroff was a senior trader at Morgan Stanley, FSA found that he disadvantaged his clients on seven occasions between June and October 2007 by partially "pre-hedging" program trades without the clients' consent.

At the material time, Mr Shroff's position at Morgan Stanley was executive director, risk-trading program and his role included the management of the programme trading risk book and the facilitation of program trades on behalf of clients. This involved the preparation of pricing and the execution of trades and the ongoing management of the risk portfolio. The overall objective of the risk book was to manage risk from customer trades.

"Program trading" is the term used to describe a transaction or series of transactions by an institution when acquiring or disposing of an entire portfolio or a material part of a portfolio. Program trades can be all "one way" or a combination of buys and sells.

All the program trades made by Mr Shroff on behalf of clients were made on a principal (rather than agency) basis. For a principal trade, typically a number of brokers will be asked to tender to acquire the portfolio from or for the institution, quoting a premium or discount to the mid-price for each security at a designated strike time, which is known as the "snap". The premium or discount (the "risk fee") is expressed in a number of basis points. Transactions with brokers are often conducted via an institution's centralised dealing desk.

Principal trades are attractive to customers who want to undertake a large number of trades at the same time but do not want to assume the risk of the share prices moving against them in the period between the commencement and completion of trading. The broker assumes that risk in return for the risk premium.

The execution of a principal programme trade usually involves the following steps:

  1. The customer provides limited information about its portfolio, e.g. sectors and percentages of average daily volume ("ADV"), to a number of brokers to enable them to assess the risk and quote for the trade, but without disclosing the component securities and, usually, whether the customer is a buyer or a seller in respect of each;
  2. The customer receives the quotes from the brokers;
  3. The customer reviews the quotes and awards the trade to one of the brokers;
  4. The customer communicates the award to the winning broker and a snap time is agreed;
  5. The customer provides the broker with the full details of the component securities and indicates whether they are buying or selling; sometimes this information is provided before the snap but more usually afterwards. In the case of the trades referred to in this notice, details of the portfolios were provided to Morgan Stanley before the snap;
  6. Each stock is supplied to or purchased from the customer by the broker at the snap time at the quoted premium or discount to the mid-market price.

"Pre-hedging" refers to trading by a broker for his firm's benefit in advance of carrying out a trade for his customer, using information provided by that customer. Where customers instructed Shroff to buy particular stocks, he bought those stocks for the firm first, causing the price to increase before he executed the customers' trades. Where the customer order was to sell he first sold on behalf of the firm, decreasing the price. Shroff knew such unauthorised pre-hedging was expressly prohibited by FSA and Morgan Stanley's policies and not in his clients' interests.

It appears that pre-hedging is a kind of front-running in the context of program trading.

Wednesday, May 27, 2009

Securities Trading of Regulators

As an employee of a securities regulator, conducting securities trading for personal account may pose a conflict of interest problem. Internal rules must be developed to prevent and detect sensitive trading activities.

The new Chairman of US SEC recently outlined a series of measures the agency is taking to strengthen its internal compliance program to guard against inappropriate employee securities trading.

The measures the agency is taking include:

  1. The staff has drafted a set of new internal rules governing securities transactions for all SEC employees that will require preclearance of all trades. It also will, for the first time, prohibit staff trading in the securities of companies under SEC investigation regardless of whether the employee has personal knowledge of the investigation.
  2. SEC is contracting with an outside firm to develop a computer compliance system to track, audit and oversee employee securities transactions and financial disclosure in real time.
  3. SEC Chairman has signed an order consolidating responsibility for oversight of employee securities transactions and financial disclosure reporting within the Ethics Office. And, she has authorized the hiring of a new chief compliance officer.

The staff has drafted internal rules governing securities trading and has submitted those rules for clearance by the Office of Government Ethics.

Current agency rules prohibit, among other things, short selling, carrying securities on margin, engaging in options or futures transactions in instruments whose value is derived from an underlying security, and holding a security interest in broker-dealers and registered investment advisers. The current rules also mandate that employees hold stock that they purchase for at least six months to limit speculative activity. Further, SEC employees are required to report all trades within five days of receiving confirmations.

In addition to the existing rules, the newly-approved rules will:

  • Require employees to pre-clear all their securities transactions to ensure, among other things, the company whose stock they are trading is neither being investigated by the SEC nor is involved in an IPO. Also, any employee with access to non-public information about a company's registration statement may not trade in that security.
  • Prohibit ownership of securities in publicly-traded exchanges and transfer agents, in addition to existing prohibitions against owning securities in broker-dealers, registered investment advisers and others directly regulated by SEC.
  • Require that all employees authorize their brokers to provide the agency with duplicate trade confirmation statements. Those statements would then be integrated into a new computerized system so that employees can more easily comply with reporting obligations and the ethics office can more effectively monitor compliance.
  • Require employees to certify before any trade that they do not possess any non-public information about the company being traded.

As part of the pre-clearance and compliance process, periodic reviews will be conducted by supervisors to compare transactions against the employee's work projects to guarantee compliance with the rules.

SEC is contracting with an outside firm to develop a new agency-wide computer system that will enable the Ethics Office to pre-clear and track all employee securities transactions for compliance with the rules. The new system would automate employee reporting of personal securities transactions which would simplify the reporting process for employees and ensure accurate pre-clearance checks. It would also provide for easy verification of transactions by comparing reported trades against confirmation statements provided directly by each employee's brokerage firm. Further, the system would permit the Ethics Office to monitor transactions and detect any irregularities.

Finally, the new system would capture the trades of all employees in one system rather than a series of various handwritten forms that are not presently required from all agency personnel.

I suggest HKMA and SFC also publicize their internal employing trading rules for the sake of good corporate goverance.

Wednesday, May 20, 2009

Proxy Voting

The suspected "vote-rigging" case of PCCW has alerted us that the voting result could be manipulated even the so-called beneficial "shareholders" are present to vote by themselves. If proxy voting is used, then the conflict of interest problem may even be more inevitable.

US SEC recently charged INTECH Investment Management and its former chief operating officer David E. Hurley for violating the SEC's proxy voting rule for investment advisers by not sufficiently describing its proxy voting policies and procedures and failing to address a material potential conflict of interest.

The proxy voting rule requires registered investment advisers to adopt proxy voting policies and describe them to clients, including procedures to address material conflicts of interest that may arise between the adviser and its clients. The rule is designed to ensure that advisers vote proxies in their clients' best interests, and provide clients with information about how their proxies are voted. This is the first enforcement action taken by the SEC for a proxy voting rule violation.

INTECH managed institutional portfolios for pension plans, foundations, unions, public funds and public corporations. As part of its investment advisory services, INTECH exercised voting authority over many of its clients' securities or proxies. In connection with the proxy voting rule, which became effective 10 March 2003, INTECH adopted and implemented written proxy voting policies and procedures and provided them to its clients. Hurley reviewed and edited counsel's drafts of those policies and procedures.

SEC found that INTECH exercised voting authority over client securities without including in its policies and procedures how it would address material potential conflicts of interests. Specifically, INTECH chose a particular set of voting recommendations for all clients without addressing and describing in the policies and procedures its potential effect on INTECH's ability to retain and obtain business from a particular subset of its clients.

After receiving complaints from some of its union-affiliated clients about pro-management proxy votes, INTECH selected a third-party proxy voting service provider's guidelines to vote in accordance with AFL-CIO (Note) based proxy voting recommendations for all clients' securities. INTECH selected the guidelines that followed the AFL-CIO proxy voting recommendations at a time when it was participating in the annual AFL-CIO Key Votes Survey that ranked investment advisers based on their adherence to the AFL-CIO recommendations on certain votes.

When INTECH advised its clients about its proxy voting policies and procedures, it told clients that because it relied on a third-party proxy voting service, it did not expect that any conflicts would arise in the proxy voting process. Accordingly, INTECH's policies and procedures did not include how INTECH would address material potential conflicts of interests that may have arisen between its interests and those of its clients. INTECH also did not sufficiently describe its proxy voting policies and procedures to clients.

Without admitting or denying any of the findings, INTECH agreed to pay a penalty of US$300,000 and Hurley agreed to pay a US$50,000 penalty. In addition, SEC's order censures INTECH and Hurley and requires them to cease and desist from committing or causing any violations and any future violations.

Note: AFL-CIO stands for American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations, which is a national trade union center, the largest federation of unions in US, made up of 56 national and international unions (including Canadian), together representing more than 10 million workers.

Wednesday, May 13, 2009

Licensing of Compliance Officers

Before the SFO was finalized 7 years ago, I heard there had been a debate about whether requiring compliance officers to be licensed by SFC, i.e. creating a new regulated activity (RA10?) for them. The final conclusion was NO. Subsequently another query is whether SFC would licence compliance officers if they apply for them.

SFC has just released a new FAQ to address this enquiry, where SFC's answers are:
  • Normally, SFC will not license back office staff, including compliance officers and in-house legal counsel.
  • If a person who is employed by a licensed corporation in such a role does not perform functions that directly relate to the conduct of the regulated activity for which the corporation is licensed, SFC will neither license him as a representative nor approve him as a responsible officer.
  • SFC takes the view that competent compliance officers or in-house legal counsel do not necessarily possess the qualifications and experience necessary to be approved as responsible officers. Frequently, they do not possess such qualifications and experience.
  • SFC also considers that the functions of compliance officers and in-house legal counsel are inherently different from those of epresentatives who are licensed to carry on regulated activities for the licensed corporation to which they are accredited.
  • One of the primary functions of a licensed corporation's compliance officer or in-house legal counsel is to ensure regulatory compliance both on the part of the licensed corporation and also on the part of the licensed representatives accredited to it. As a matter of general principle, SFC considers it necessary for there to be segregation between the performance of this function and the performance of the activities that constitute the carrying on of regulated activities. Without such segregation, there would be inherent conflict arising out of a compliance officer or in-house legal counsel carrying on the regulated activities for which the corporation employing him is licensed and, at the same time, being responsible for supervising such activities for the purposes of regulatory compliance.
  • This is underscored in SFC's Management, Supervision and Internal Control Guidelines, which states, "Management establishes and maintains an appropriate and effective compliance function within the firm which, subject to constraint of size, is independent of all operational and business functions, and which reports directly to the Management".
  • As a matter of general principle, compliance officers and in-house counsel who are employed by a licensed corporation should refrain from carrying on the regulated activities for which the corporation is licensed.

Interestingly, for smaller firms who can't afford a full-time compliance officer, usually a responsible officer is also taking up the compliance role. Such conflict of interest is unavoidable.