Wednesday, September 16, 2009
City of Greed
Last month FINRA has barred Tamara Lanz Moon from the securities industry for wrongfully taking over US$850,000 in funds from at least 22 customers, including her own father. Moon was also charged with falsifying numerous account records, engaging in unauthorized trades in customer accounts and related recordkeeping violations.
Moon's misconduct occurred over an eight-year period ending in March 2008, while she was working as a sales assistant for Citigroup Global Markets at the firm's Palo Alto, CA, branch office. Citigroup has compensated customers for losses resulting from Moon's misconduct.
FINRA found that Moon targeted elderly, ill or otherwise vulnerable customers whom she believed were unable to monitor their accounts. Victims of Moon's scheme included elderly customers (including a senior with Parkinson's disease), an American diplomat and even her own father. Moon forged signatures on letters of instruction requesting unauthorized address changes, trades and transfers between and to accounts controlled by Moon for the purpose of paying her personal expenses, remodeling her home and making personal investments in other real estate properties.
In one case, FINRA found that Moon misappropriated approximately US$26,000 belonging to an elderly widow. In November 2006, following the death of the customer's husband, Moon helped the widow consolidate her holdings into one Citigroup account. In June 2007, when the widow was 83 years old, Moon began moving money from the widow's Citigroup account — without the widow's authorization — to accounts owned by Moon and to accounts owned by other Citigroup customers to replace funds Moon had previously stolen from those accounts.
To further her scheme, Moon falsified documents requesting address changes. On May 21, 2007, the widow's account appeared on an internal report that indicated a discrepancy between the address on the widow's account and her address in government and telephone directories. Moon explained the discrepancy to Citigroup by falsely stating that the "client moved into a nursing home."
Moon's misconduct was not limited to taking funds belonging to elderly widows. Moon misappropriated approximately US$55,000 belonging to an American diplomat working overseas, who held custodial accounts at Citigroup for his two daughters, and forged his signature on authorizations to change his address so account statements wouldn't reach him.
Moon also misappropriated funds belonging to her own father. In January 2006, Moon created a phony account for her father, without his knowledge or consent, and used this account to misuse approximately US$30,000 belonging to her father and approximately US$250,000 belonging to other Citigroup customers. On 20 January 2006, Moon forged her father's signature on a letter of authorization to Citigroup, changing the address on the account to keep account statements from being sent to her father. From August 2006 to March 2008, Moon requested and processed unauthorized cash transfers into her father's phony account from other Citigroup customers totaling over US$250,000. During this same timeframe, Moon — again forging her father's signature — disbursed the funds from the account for her own personal use.
Another bastard!
Wednesday, September 09, 2009
HKSI LE Paper 2 Past Paper (2)
21(A) - (I) and (II) are the facts and thus (III) and (IV) must be wrong.
22(D) - ATS provider should be either authorized by SFC or licensed by SFC for Type 7. Firms whose business is principal dealing is exempt from being licensed for Type 1. Trust companies registered under Trustee Ordinance are exempt from being licensed for Type 1 when acting as an agent for a collective investment scheme.
23(A) - Without the quotation rules, the share price fluctuations may not fluctuate in an orderly way.
24(D) - (A) is wrong because following the demutualization of SEHK an exchange participant has no longer been required to be a shareholder of SEHK. (B) is wrong because the transfer of exchange participantship is approved by SEHK. (C) is wrong because a SFC licensed corporation should separately make an application for exchange participantship to SEHK.
25(D) - (I) is wrong because individual investors may also open accounts with HKSCC.
26(C) - (C) is incorrect because such marking to market is only required on at least daily basis.
27(C) - (C) is incorrect because some other securities listed on Main Board (e.g. illiquid stocks, warrants) may also not be short sold.
28(D) - (I) is wrong because there is no such requirement. In fact, it would be inconvenient to combine the annual standing authority with the client agreement.
29(B) - (B) is incorrect because such a journalist, even not licensed by SFC, may still be prosecuted by SFC for "disclosure of false or misleading information" (one kind of market misconduct).
30(C) - Both (A) and (B) are unfavorable to the clients without reason. (D) is wrong because such requirement does not exist and is not practical.
31(C) - An approved introducting agent is not subject to the Rules per (I), (II) and (IV) because it would never hold client assets, while contract notes and statements are issued by the execution broker instead.
32(A) - (II) is wrong because the offer and distribution as part of a listing is covered by SEHK's Listing Rules instead. (III) is wrong because not all kinds of securities are covered by CO for offering.
33(D) - (I) is wrong because only eligible an options exchange participant can become a market maker. (III) is wrong because there is no market maker system for equity securities.
34(D) - (D) is wrong because the use of modeling techniques is for risk monitoring, not risk reduction.
35(A) - (III) is wrong because there is no such thing as "independent clearing participant". (IV) is wrong because self-dealing participant can't clear the transactions of other participants.
36(C) - Retaining even the balance of any proceeds after meeting in full the client's obligations is obviously not a reasonable step.
37(B) - (B) is exactly describing the behavior of front-running. (A) is cold calling. (C) is churing. (D) is wash sale.
38(A) - (B) is wrong because the Investment Compensation Fund covers only investors who have suffered from defaults of certain intermediaries. (C) is wrong because an investor has no such right. (D) is wrong because such insurance is not claimed for dealing misconduct.
39(C) - Possession of professional qualifications is not relevant to the misconduct.
40(C) - MMT can only impose civil sanctions and thus imprisonment is not available.
Wednesday, September 02, 2009
HKSI LE Paper 2 Past Paper (1)
HKSI LE Paper 2 (Dec 2006) - Q&A 1~20 (with explanations):
1(A) - Even a stock has been suspended for trading, those transactions completed before the suspension should be settled as usual. There is not such thing called Securities & Futures (Suspension of Trading) Rules. Nobody is entitled to any compension due to trading suspension.
2(C) - (I), (II) and (IV) are correct based on common senses of law. (III) is wrong because PDPO does not require the provision of access to personal data free of charge.
3(A) - (C) and (D) are too serious to pass the fit and proper standards. When comparing (A) and (B), obviously (A) is less adverse.
4(A) - Listing of companies is covered by Listing Rules. Issue of contract notes is covered by Securities & Futures (Contract Notes, Statements of Account and Receipts) Rules.
5(D) - Institutional investor is typically subject to less investor protection under SFO and thus not protected by Securities & Futures (Investor Compensation - Claims) Rules.
6(C) - (A) is wrong because annual audited accounts must be submitted to SFC within 4 months of the financial year end. (B) is wrong because appointment of an auditor must be notified to SFC within 7 business days. (D) is wrong because financial year end must be notified to SFC within 1 month.
7(B) - In (I), (II) and (III), the client can confirm that the intermediary has received his assets in an alternative way, thus issue of a receipt by the intermediary is exempted by the Rules.
8(B) - For records which are orders and instructions from clients, the record retention period required by the Rules is only 2 years, while 7 years is applicable to all other records.
9(A) - (I) is incorrect because the Fund would not cover certain professional investors and clients of certain intermediaries. (II) is incorrect because the Fund cover all securities traded on SEHK.
10(B) - (I) is wrong because contract notes must be issued within T+2. (IV) is wrong because the two intermediaries must agree in writing as to who will provide contract notes to the client.
11(C) - Segregation of client money within 1 business day is specified by the Rules.
12(D) - It is not practical for the licensed person to notify the client before dealing in options through another intermediary, thus (D) would not be included in the options client agreement.
13(B) - (B) is correct because such goods and services are of demonstrable benefits to the clients.
14(A) - "Prompt execution" and "best execution" are obviously related to the broker's level of diligence.
15(C) - The dealer has failed to fulfil the "prompt execution" requirement under the diligence principle under the Code.
16(C) - (III) is a requirement under Securities & Futures (Client Securities) Rules and thus can't be waived.
17(D) - (D) is wrong because tape records must be kept for at least 3 months.
18(D) - (I) is wrong because a guideline can never override the Code.
19(A) - Simply speaking, there are no such requirements as (III) and (IV) in the Listing Rules.
20(A) - Exchange traded options are traded on the Hong Kong Futures Automated Trading System (HKATS).
Wednesday, August 26, 2009
Market Misconduct by Overseas Entity
According to an article of Finance Asia, the Tiger Asia fund is one of many Tiger-branded funds that have been seeded by the original Tiger Fund daddy, Julian Robertson. Hwang's Tiger Asia fund is among the first of the "Tiger baby" funds that Robertson began to nurture in 2000, after he had closed his own, massively successful hedge fund.
SFC has applied for an injunction order to freeze assets of Tiger Asia and the three senior officers, including those located overseas, up to $29.9 million. The amount is equivalent to the notional profit made by Tiger Asia in alleged insider dealing and market manipulation activities.
The proceedings followed an SFC investigation into suspected insider dealing and market manipulation by Tiger Asia and the three senior officers in relation to dealings in the shares of China Construction Bank Corporation (CCB) on 6 January 2009.
SFC alleges that:
- on 6 January 2009, before the market opened, a placing agent in Hong Kong invited Tiger Asia to participate in a proposed placement of CCB shares in Hong Kong by the Bank of America Corporation (BOA);
- the placing agent told Tiger Asia about the size and the discount range of the proposed placement;
- this information was confidential and price sensitive and Tiger Asia and the three senior officers knew this;
- Tiger Asia then short-sold a total of 93 million CCB shares on 6 January 2009 ahead of the public announcement of the CCB placement;
- Tiger Asia covered its short sales out of the placement shares that it bought on 7 January 2009 at a discount to the prevailing market price; and
- Tiger Asia made a substantial notional profit of $29.9 million.
SFC also:
- alleges downward manipulation of CCB share price by Tiger Asia on 6 January 2009 at the time of the short sales;
- is seeking final orders against Tiger Asia and the three senior officers, including orders to unwind the relevant transactions if the court finds the transactions have contravened SFO and to restore affected counterparties to their pre-transaction positions;
- considers it necessary to seek a freezing order to ensure there are sufficient assets to satisfy any restoration orders that may be made by the court; and
- is seeking orders to prevent Tiger Asia and the three senior officers from trading in listed securities and derivatives in Hong Kong in similar circumstances.
Overseas entities might think that SFC can never taken any legal / regulatory action against their insider dealing and market manipulation because they are not located at Hong Kong. Let's see if SFC can "beat the tiger" this time.
Wednesday, August 19, 2009
Licensing Requirements for Selling ILAS
Regulated activities relating to the sale of ILAS are Type 1 (dealing in securities) and Type 4 (advising on securities). ILAS by itself is defined as a collective investment scheme (CIS) but excluded from the definition of "securities" under SFO. The question is whether advising clients acquiring ILAS on the selection of underlying funds would constitute dealing in securities or advising on securities.
In its circular, SFC highlights that premium payments made by ILAS policyholders are first applied in respect of fees and commissions, with the balance being paid to the insurer and notionally invested in the underlying funds specified by policyholders. Although it is the performance of these underlying funds that determines the value of the ILAS policy from time to time, the policyholder's premium payments are not invested in these underlying funds for them. Instead, these investments, if made, are for the account of the insurer itself.
SFC takes the view that advising or making recommendations to policyholders concerning the selection by them of the underlying funds of ILAS, does not constitute advising on securities, even if those underlying funds are securities. The reasons are as follows:
- Advising on securities, within the meaning of SFO, is concerned with advice relating to the acquisition or disposal of securities by the person being advised. In the case of ILAS, the underlying funds are not acquired or disposed of.
- Advice given to ILAS policyholders is only concerned with selection of underlying funds whose performance will notionally be used to calculate the value of the ILAS policy from time to time.
SFC also takes the view that promoting, offering or selling ILAS to the public (including giving advice to policyholders concerning selection of underlying funds) does not constitute dealing in securities, which is defined as making an agreement with another person or inducing another person to enter into an agreement (a) for acquiring, disposing of, subscribing for or underwriting securities; or (b) the the purpose of which is to secure a profit from the yield of securities or by reference to fluctuations in the value of securities. The reasons are as follows:
- Units in ILAS are not securities.
- Underlying funds of ILAS are not acquired or disposed of for the policyholders.
- It can't be said that the purpose (or even the dominant purpose) of acquiring an ILAS policy is to secure a profit from fluctuations in the value of underlying funds.
- SFO definition of dealing in securities excludes the issue of any advertisement, invitation document authorized by SFC.
Even if advising concerning ILAS underlying funds were regarded as advising on securities or dealing in securities, SFC considers that there would be no carrying on of a business in these regulated activities. This is because advising concerning ILAS underlying funds:
- does not stand alone as a discrete business carried on its own right
- by itself does not generate any financial gain
- appears to occur haphazardly
- does not indicate the existence of an established and ongoing business principally involving that particular activity
Two important implications could be derived from this circular. First, insurance intermediaries would no longer be regulated by SFC when they are selling (or mis-selling) ILAS and advising (or mis-advising) ILAS underlying funds. Second, in future the number of licensed corporations and representatives would be substantially reduced because:
- Selling of direct funds (no matter by banks, brokers or so-called IFA) constitutes only dealing in securities, not advising on securities.
- Corporations / representatives licensed for Type 1 could advise on securities without Type 4 based on the "wholly incidental" exemption.
- Advising concerning ILAS underlying funds is no longer regarded as Type 4.
You may doubt whether this SFC circular is also relevant to promotion, selling or offering of MPF schemes (which are also regarded as CIS but not securities under SFO). My interpretation is that even selling of MPF schemes does not constitute Type 1, advising concerning constituent funds of MPF schemes may still fall within Type 4 because, unlike ILAS, constituent funds are acquired or disposed of for employee participants.
SFC had better issue a separate circular to clarify the licensing requirements for selling of MPF schemes. If MPF intermediaries were also exempt from licensing, then we may envisage that in future only equity research analysts need to be licensed for Type 4.
Wednesday, August 12, 2009
Flash Orders
Flash order technology means high-frequency trading, a lightning-fast, computer-based trading technique. It allows some traders to have a sneak peek at market activity, giving high-frequency traders an advantage over retail investors.
Flash orders were pioneered by the Chicago Board Options Exchange's stock exchange earlier this decade as that exchange looked for a way to improve execution speeds. Flash remained a niche part of the industry until around June 2006, when a small stock-trading platform, Direct Edge, owned by Knight Capital Group Inc., adopted the practice. Now, Direct Edge is the third-largest stock trading platform by matched volume in the country. Its success has helped prompt competitors to adopt their own versions of flash.
In a flash order, a firm wishing to buy or sell stock can elect to freeze the order on an exchange for as long as half a second. This move can have several effects, one of which concerns a system of rebates and fees on trading orders. Typically on trades, exchanges pay rebates to traders who post shares to buy or sell and charge fees to traders who respond to those offers. This setup creates an incentive to earn rebates. A flash order puts a trader in the position of poster, rather than responder. The hope is that another trader who needs to buy or sell quickly steps in on the other side of the trade. This dynamic boosts the chance the flash-order trader will complete the trade on the exchange and get the rebate.
The following diagram found from the internet explains how flash orders work:

Critics say that flash orders give the high-speed traders a window into the direction of the market, giving them the ability to trade at lightning speeds ahead of less fleet-footed investors. On the other hand, flash-order advocates say the orders help traders get better prices. They say a ban could cause trading volume to drop on the exchanges that permit flash as traders look for better execution in alternative, less-transparent venues.
Meanwhile, in a sign of regulators' growing concern about evolving electronic trading, SEC staff is also studying rules for so-called dark pools, private electronic-trading networks that match buyers and sellers anonymously. The pools have been gaining market share in recent years as more trading firms use them.
SEC staff is looking at requiring disclosure of post-trade information to show which dark-pool operator is executing which trades, according to people familiar with the matter. That would give investors a better idea of the liquidity and depth of a particular operator. SEC is also considering whether to have the information disclosed on a real-time basis or collected and disclosed in an aggregate form.
Another area under review is the "indications of interest," which are similar to flash orders. If an exchange can't execute an order, it will look at indications of interest from a number of dark pools. Rather than flash the order for a potential mate, the exchange can route it through the dark pools that expressed indications of interest.
Are you dazzled by the flash?
Wednesday, August 05, 2009
Inter-dealer Brokers
SFC's concern is that some inter-dealer brokers might be carrying on a business in a regulated activity in Hong Kong, without having been appropriately licensed under SFO. The licensing obligation is largely dictated by the nature of the financial instruments that they trade, their clients and the booking structures which they employ. However, it is likely in most cases that inter-dealer brokers are carrying on a business in Type 1 / 2 / 3 regulated activity. Accordingly, it must be appropriately licensed unless it can rely upon any of the exemptions stipulated in SFO.
Some inter-dealer brokers might take the view that they are not required to be licensed because they are able to rely upon the "as principal" exemptions provided for in the definitions of "dealing in securities" and "dealing in futures contracts". However, SFC points out that these "as principal" exemptions are quite narrow in their scope and that some of their business activities might well fall within the above definitions.
In particular, SFC does not interpret the "as principal" exemptions as being applicable to transactions such as back-to-back arrangements which involve the temporary interposition of a third party (such as an inter-dealer broker) between the parties who are, in the real sense, the buyer and the seller. Where a broker routinely facilitates or effects such transactions by entering into back-to-back contracts with the buyer and with the seller, it is not able to rely on the "as principal" exemptions. There is no "as principal" exemption provided for in the definition of "leveraged foreign exchange trading".
Some inter-dealer brokers which are approved money brokers under Banking Ordinance might take the view that they are not required to be licensed under SFO because they are able to rely upon the "money broker" exemptions provided for in the definitions of "dealing in securities" and "leveraged foreign exchange trading". Again, SFC states that these "money broker" exemptions are quite narrow in their scope. There is no "money broker" exemption provided for in the definition of "dealing in futures contracts".
In determining whether an inter-dealer broker is able to rely upon the licensing exemptions stipulated in SFO, SFC takes into account all of the relevant facts and circumstances and, in particular, whether the business model of the broker primarily involves agency brokerage.
SFC's clarification in this circular may be coming late because I've heard many inter-dealer brokers in Hong Kong are not aware of their licensing obligations.