Wednesday, October 28, 2009

Online Securities Fraud

SFC recently charged a securities broker from Merrick, N.Y., with securities fraud for repeatedly creating and then distributing fake press releases to manipulate the stock prices of multiple publicly traded companies.

Lambros Ballas, a registered representative of NYSE firm Global Arena Capital Corporation, purported to announce good news regarding the companies, including that Google was buying one of them at a substantial premium. Ballas then posed as an investor on Internet message boards, touting the announcements he had fabricated. In one instance, his scheme caused the stock price to increase by nearly 80% within a few hours of the issuance of his phony press release.

According to SEC's complaint and other court documents filed in the case:
  • Ballas issued a phony press release the evening of 29 September 2009, announcing that Pennsylvania biotech company Discovery Laboratories had obtained approval from the U.S. Food and Drug Administration for a drug under development. Ballas then posted a message on a stock message board with a link to what he described as the company's "official press release." In his post, Ballas claimed to have called his "personal broker" who "says it's been confirmed." The next morning, Discovery Laboratories shares opened significantly higher.
  • The next day, Ballas issued another press release falsely claiming that IMAX Corporation had been acquired by Disney. Once again, he followed up by posting links to the phony release on a stock message board, telling other potential investors that he had bought 10,000 IMAX shares and that his broker "just called me to tell me at the crack of dawn."
  • Ballas continued his scheme on 1 October 2009, issuing a phony press release stating that California search engine company Local.com was being acquired by Microsoft. Ballas again followed up by posting messages and links to the Local.com release on stock message boards. In one posting he stated: "Local just bought out by Microsoft, at $12.50 per share including patent ownership." In after-market trading, Local.com's stock price rose nearly 80%.
  • Later that night, Local.com issued a corrective release saying that the Microsoft release had been false — there was no Microsoft acquisition. Undeterred, the next day Ballas issued another phony release, this time stating that it was Google, and not Microsoft, that was acquiring the company.

Shortly before he sent the hoax press release about Discovery Laboratories, Ballas’s brokerage clients purchased shares of the company and thus stood to profit by any price rise Ballas’s fake release created. Similarly, Ballas bought shares of Local.com stock just before he sent out the fake Local.com-Microsoft release so that he could capitalize on the fraudulent share price inflation he intended to trigger.

SEC’s complaint charges Ballas with violations of the antifraud provisions of the federal securities laws. The SEC seeks injunctive relief, disgorgement of ill-gotten gains, and monetary penalties against Ballas.

Wednesday, October 21, 2009

Employee Fraud

UK FSA recently fined London-based investment bank and stockbroker Seymour Pierce Limited (SPL) £154,000 for failing to establish effective controls to guard against employee fraud. As a result of SPL's failings, an employee was able to steal approximately £150,000 completely undetected from the firm's internal and private client accounts in 36 separate transactions over a three year period.

A number of the illicit transactions involved making unauthorised changes to static data (such as the client's name, address, bank account and payment instructions) on existing client accounts or taking advantage of dormant accounts. In one instance the employee transferred a personal trading loss into one of SPL's internal accounts. The employee was dismissed prior to the discovery of the misdemeanours which only came to light when his replacement noticed serious accounting discrepancies.


At the start of the relevant period (from December 2001 to February 2007), SPL's private client business consisted of only a small number of legacy private clients who had remained with the firm after the closure of the private client department in 1997. In May 2005, SPL rebuilt its private client business operations following the transfer to SPL of a private client team from a related company.

Settlements

Throughout the relevant period, trades executed by SPL on behalf of its institutional clients and private clients were settled by a third party firm pursuant to a settlements, clearing and custody arrangement. This involved a tripartite contractual relationship between SPL, the third party firm and each client. Under this arrangement, SPL retained responsibility for all aspects of the client relationship and Settlements department (Settlements) continued to play an important role in the administration of accounts set up on the third party firm's settlement system (System B), which SPL was licensed to use.

Settlements was a small team which consisted of Mr A and one or two other members of staff. Settlements staff had access rights to System B which enabled them to manually enter details of executed trades, and change static data on client accounts in accordance with clients' instructions.

Relevant Accounts

Monies and assets belonging to SPL's institutional and private clients were held in bank accounts in the name of the third party firm, and responsibility for reconciling all accounts held by SPL's institutional and private clients rested with the third party firm. The holdings and related trades were administered by SPL via client accounts set up on System B.

SPL also operated a number of its own 'internal' accounts set up on System B, including: an 'Errors Account' used for booking trades when there had been a dealing error; a 'Warehouse Account' used for administrative convenience to aggregate trades where an institutional client gave the firm an order which needed to be executed in tranches; a 'Corporate Account' used for allocating new stock holdings to client accounts; and a 'Placing Account' used for allocating stock relating to a corporate finance placing to a party that was not an existing client of the firm. SPL also had use of a 'Trading Account' established and maintained by the third party firm for all correspondent broker firms that used System B. The Trading Account was used for posting trades that various SPL institutional clients executed with the firm on a 'riskless principal' basis.

The Frauds

Between May 2003 and April 2006, Mr A stole a total of £149,165 by way of thirty-six separate transactions. Around half of this amount was from SPL and around half from SPL’s legacy private clients.

Three transactions involved Mr A stealing a total of £73,884 from SPL's legacy private clients between December 2004 and February 2005. The three legacy private client accounts involved were all dormant:

  1. One account held the proceeds of securities that had been sold in November 1998. The proceeds remained on the account accruing interest at six-monthly intervals. In December 2004, Mr A manipulated payment instructions on the account so that the total balance of £4,426 was automatically paid out to his personal bank account by the third party firm.
  2. A second account held a balance that had been accruing interest at six-monthly intervals since March 1998. In December 2004, Mr A manipulated payment instructions on the account so that the total balance on the account of £16,787 was automatically paid out to his personal bank account.
  3. A third account held securities since November 1999. In 2004, Mr A changed details on System B to transfer the securities initially to a dormant institutional client account that he had converted in October 2002 for his own use and then to his personal dealing account. Staff personal dealing accounts were set up to pay away cleared funds automatically. Therefore, when the securities were redeemed in February 2005, the proceeds of £52,670 were automatically paid to Mr A's personal bank account.

Thirty-three transactions involved Mr A stealing a total of £75,281 from SPL between May 2003 and April 2006:

  1. Twenty-four transactions related to 'riskless principal' trading profits that the firm had earned. Trading on a riskless principal basis involved SPL buying stock from (or selling to) a client in the firm’s own name (as opposed to acting as an agent) at one price and simultaneously selling the stock to (or buying from) another client at a different price. SPL traded on this basis when clients insisted that they did not want to pay agency broking commission and that instead SPL should make its profit from the difference between the buying and selling price. These trades should have been booked onto the Trading Account. However, instead Mr A booked the trades onto the dormant institutional client account. Mr A had manipulated payment instructions on this dormant account in October 2002 so that the monies were automatically paid out by the third party firm via cheques sent to his home address. Mr A stole a total of £39,127 from the firm in this way between May 2003 and March 2005. After this date Mr A was deterred from diverting any further riskless principal trading profits for his own benefit due to the implementation by SPL of a computerised front office order management system.
  2. Seven transactions related to interest that was due to the firm. Institutional clients normally settled their transactions on a delivery-versus-payment basis. This meant that balances would not normally be left on their accounts and no interest would accrue. However, where interest did accrue on these accounts, SPL's terms of business made it clear that it would be due and payable to SPL. Mr A was able to commit six of the seven frauds by manipulating payment instructions on client accounts where interest had accrued. This resulted in the monies being automatically paid either directly to his personal bank account or by cheque sent to his home address. The other fraud involved the diversion of interest that had accrued on SPL's internal Placing Account to Mr A’s personal bank account. Mr A stole a total of £22,257 from the firm in this way between October 2004 and September 2005.
  3. One transaction involved Mr A transferring, into the firm's Warehouse Account, a loss that he had incurred on his personal dealing account. SPL employees were permitted to be SPL clients and to maintain accounts set up on System B through which they could buy and sell securities, in accordance with the firm’s personal dealing procedures. Mr A sold stock in his own name in March 2005, incurring a loss of £2,883 on a corresponding purchase trade that he had instructed the firm's front office to effect but which he had not settled. He then transferred both trades (and the resulting loss) from his personal dealing account into the firm's internal Warehouse Account by misleading an employee at the third party firm and misusing his access rights to System B.
  4. One transaction related to dealing commission that SPL had earned on the sale of an institutional client's shares. Mr A was able to commit this fraud by incorrectly booking the dealing commission to the client's account and manipulating payment instructions so that the monies were automatically paid to his personal bank account. Mr A stole a sum of £11,015 from the firm in this way in April 2006.

Static Data Monitoring

Static data is information held on a client account which does not often change, such as the client's name and address and the client's payment instructions. SPL's Settlements team was responsible for making changes to static data on accounts set up on System B in accordance with client instructions. There was therefore a material risk that static data might be improperly altered by Settlements staff and it was necessary for SPL to mitigate this risk.

Static data on client accounts could be set up to facilitate payment in one of two ways: 'Pay away funds' – accounts set up to pay out cleared funds arising on the account automatically either as they arose or at pre-set intervals; or 'Retain funds' – accounts set up to retain any cleared funds arising on the account indefinitely.

For accounts set up on System B to retain funds, SPL sought to control payments out by requiring payment instructions to be authorised by a member of the firm’s Finance department (Finance). However, this control by Finance did not apply where an account was set up to pay away funds automatically. A dishonest member of staff in Settlements might therefore circumvent this control by improperly changing the status of the account from 'retain funds' to 'pay away funds' and changing the payee’s details to those of an account that he controlled. It was therefore important that SPL monitored changes to payment instruction static data on client accounts.

A daily exception report was generated which detailed all changes to static data made on accounts set up on System B. This report was accessible to members of SPL's Compliance department (Compliance) and Settlements for monitoring purposes. However, prior to February 2004 it was only accessed by Mr A at SPL. After February 2004, Compliance also accessed the report to carry out sample checks of the client's categorisation on the system and to ensure that all new accounts had received Compliance sign-off. After SPL's new private client department opened in May 2005, these reviews were extended to include sample checks against details contained in the application forms of new clients. However, during the Relevant Period Compliance's reviews of the daily exception reports did not focus on changes made to static data on existing accounts. As a result, if Settlements staff manipulated static data on older client accounts, it was unlikely that this activity would be discovered by Compliance.

Thirty-three of the frauds committed by Mr A between May 2003 and April 2006 involved unauthorised changes to static data made by Mr A on twelve client accounts. In this way, SPL's failure to adequately monitor static data changes facilitated the theft of £92,107.

Dormant Account Monitoring and Control

A dormant account is an account on which there has been no trading activity for a period of at least two years or that is otherwise known to be inactive. Dormant client accounts carry an increased risk of fraud because they are not likely to be monitored by the clients who hold them. The risk of misuse applied to all dormant accounts, whether they were institutional client accounts or private client accounts.

SPL did not adequately control dormant client accounts to prevent them being misused. The majority of the legacy private client accounts that remained open during the Relevant Period were dormant. This was therefore a particularly high risk category of accounts that required SPL's attention. Significant efforts were made by SPL to contact legacy private clients and return any balances on their accounts following the closure of the old SPL private client department in 1997. However, SPL was unable to close thirty-eight legacy private client accounts, some of which continued to hold client money or assets. SPL was unable to locate and obtain instructions from those legacy private clients, and accordingly those legacy accounts remained. Despite the fraud risks posed by these legacy accounts, SPL allowed them to be left open on System B without putting in place a process for monitoring any activity on them.

Twenty-six of the frauds committed by Mr A between May 2003 and March 2005, involved the misuse of a total of four dormant institutional client and/or legacy private client accounts. In this way, SPL's failure to adequately monitor and control dormant accounts facilitated the theft of £108,891.

Reconciliation of Internal Accounts

It was necessary for SPL to monitor its internal accounts in order to identify any errors in the booking of entries onto System B by Settlements staff and to identify any manipulative practices involving these accounts. However, there was no process in place at SPL to adequately govern this area.

As part of his responsibilities, SPL expected Mr A to regularly reconcile the firm’s internal accounts. However, for at least fifteen months he did not reconcile these accounts at all. He was not challenged by SPL over the fact that he had not been reconciling these accounts until around October 2005. The fact that the reconciliations had not been completed for a substantial period of time then made it difficult and time-consuming for him to complete them. This gave Mr A an apparently plausible excuse to delay further, which SPL accepted.

Two of the frauds committed by Mr A involved the misuse of SPL internal accounts, namely the Placing Account (theft of £1,505 interest in October 2004) and the Warehouse Account (transfer of a £2,883 personal dealing loss in March 2005).

Twenty-four of the frauds (theft of riskless principal trading profits of £39,127 between May 2003 and March 2005) involved monies that should have been booked to the Trading Account. This was not one of SPL's internal accounts, but SPL should have taken steps to ensure that the booking of entries that should have been posted to this account by Settlements was being monitored. SPL introduced an electronic order management system in 2005. However, before this system was introduced, SPL should have mitigated fraud risk in this area, for example, by independently reconciling trades executed by its front office against those booked by Settlements.

If SPL had taken proper steps to ensure that such reconciliations were completed during the Relevant Period, it is likely that Mr A would have been deterred from committing some of the frauds. Effective and independent monitoring of internal account reconciliations would have also led to his fraudulent activity being detected earlier.

Discovery of Issues

In July 2006, SPL dismissed Mr A. The replacement that SPL recruited in August 2006 was asked to reconcile the firm's internal accounts as a priority. In January 2007, when reconciling the Warehouse Account, Mr A's replacement discovered one of the frauds. Further investigations by SPL in the following months uncovered the remaining frauds.

Wednesday, October 14, 2009

MMT Case Against Sun Hung Kai

This week the talk of the town in the compliance field is the report issued by Market Misconduct Tribunal (MMT) on the case of QPL International Holdings Ltd.

SFC publicly reprimanded Sun Hung Kai Investment Services Ltd (SHKIS) and fined it $4,000,000 for internal control failures that contributed to market misconduct (false trading and price rigging). Following an inquiry into dealing in the shares of QPL in 2003, MMT found on 22 January 2009 that Mr Edmond Chau Chin Hung (a former responsible officer of SHKIS) and Ms Connie Cheung Sau Lin (a former account executive of SHKIS) engaged in false trading and price rigging, contrary to SFO, for the period from 6 May to 10 June 2003.

MMT further found that:
  • the misconduct of Chau was attributable to SHKIS of whom he was an executive director and responsible officer, and to Cheeroll Ltd (now renamed Sun Hung Kai Strategic Capital Ltd) for whom Chau was authorised to trade; and
  • SHKIS was vicariously liable for the misconduct of Cheung.

On 25 February 2009, MMT made certain orders including recommending that disciplinary action be taken by SFC against SHKIS, Chau and Cheung. SFC found that there were internal control failures at SHKIS that contributed to the market misconduct because:

  • despite policies to segregate proprietary trading and client trading, SHKIS gave Chau the authority to conduct both types of trading which gave him the opportunity to misuse information gathered on the client trading side of the business to engage in unlawful activities in a proprietary account;
  • at material times, SHKIS allowed Chau and Cheung to place orders in the same dealing room by open "outcry", which was inconsistent with SHKIS' formal policy to physically separate proprietary and client trading functions; and
  • SHKIS did not detect Chau and Cheung's misconduct for five weeks until brought to its attention by SFC.

Further details disclosed in MMT's report:

  • In October 2002 and February 2003, Chau arranged two placements of QPL's shares on behalf of Sun Hung Kai International Limited to two clients, namely Chinacal Limited and Honest Opportunity Limited, generating total commissions of around $8 million.
  • Since 1997, Chau had been authorized to operate the house account of Cheeroll. Between 6 May and 10 June 2003, he made numerous "buy", "cancel" and "reduce" orders for Cheeroll in its account with SHKIS to trade QPL shares. Not a single share was acquired in the course of those orders.
  • During the same period, Cheung (direct subordinate of Chau) sold through SHKIS substantial quantities of QPL shares on behalf of Chinacal and Honest Opportunity.
  • Since Chau had suggested Chinacal and Honest Opportunity take substantial tranches of QPL shares, he was motivated to "scaffold" in the account of Cheeroll in order to enable them to sell those shares more easily and quickly.

Let's wait and see how SFC would discipline Chau and Cheung as well.

Wednesday, October 07, 2009

Failure to Prevent Insider Dealing

We all know insider dealing is illegal, and so Du Jun (former investment banker of Morgan Stanley) was imposed a 7-year imprisonment term. But don't you think broker firms should be obliged to report insider dealing of their clients to the regulatory body (like the reporting of money laundering)?

Recently FSA fined Mark Lockwood, a former trading desk manager at a retail stockbroking firm, £20,000 for failing to observe proper standards of market conduct. Lockwood failed to identify and act on a suspicious client order that allowed the firm to be used to facilitate insider dealing. As a result of his failings the firm failed to identify the trade as suspicious and report it to the FSA.

Lockwood's misconduct related to his dealings with a client who sold shares in oil and gas exploration company Amerisur on 23 May 2007 - ahead of an announcement by the company of a placing of shares the next day. The client has been subject to separate FSA enforcement action for market abuse in relation to Amerisur shares. Lockwood was aware of the client's possession of inside information by means of telephone conversations with him.

Lockwood failed to identify that the transaction was being conducted on the basis of inside information, despite his own knowledge of the impending transaction and clear warning signals from the client. He failed to prevent the trade or alert his firm to the possibility that the trade was being conducted on the basis of inside information. As a result no Suspicious Transaction Report (STR) was submitted to the FSA and the trading only came to light because of a report submitted by another broker.

For details of the story, please refer to FSA's Final Notice.

I wonder if SFC would consider implementation of the STR regime for insider dealing and market manipulation in future.